Macroeconomic performance and country size in the Euro area: the importance of being small
The overall growth performance of the euro area since the inception of monetary union in what has become a booming world has been disappointing, to put it mildly. If efficiency measures the ratio of results compared to efforts, then the efficiency of EMU is quite low: nowhere in the developed and emergent world for the last fifteen years have efforts been deployed harder to build strong economic institutions and nowhere has economic performance, measured by real growth rate of GDP, been so feeble 2 .
Yet, this weak performance can not be fully captured without understanding that member states diverge a great deal in their macroeconomic scoreboard. The reasons for this divergence are very complex, even if it has often been reduced in the literature to the issue of flexibility and rigidity of social models in general and labour markets in particular (see Sapir, 2006 for a recent attempt). In the paper, we prolong another type of explanation, which theoretical foundations can be found in Laurent & Le Cacheux (2006) . To put it simply, we argue that country size plays a major role in macroeconomic performance, especially in the case of a monetary union.
In the present paper, we focus our attention on Germany and Ireland, respectively the biggest and the second smallest euro area economy. Their belonging to the euro area is crucial for our argument given the constraints that the EMU put on the use of macroeconomic policies and the incentives its institutions shape for national growth strategies.
A basic national breakdown of growth and unemployment performance between 1995 and 2005 (we will have something to say in the conclusion about the year 2006) make Ireland and Germany stand out, for the best and the worst (Chart 1, Chart 2 and Chart 3). Source: Eurostat.
2 For a detailed assessment and some nuances, see Creel, Laurent and Le Cacheux (2007) . 
Why should size matter for countries' economic performance?
Is size really an important determinant of economic performance in the Euro area and how? The relation between country size and economic policy has been an essential feature of economic policy theory until the end of the 1970s (see Robinson, 1960) before it gradually gave way to a deterritorialized approach to national models often exclusively characterized by their social compact. To quote Robinson in the Introduction of the 1960 volume, the economics of the size of nations (that can be traced at least to J.S. Mill) is "a subject that well deserves more attention".
The flaws of an approach to economic policy that would posit the "death of size" in a similar way than the "death of distance" has been postulated should be obvious. Yet, on the basis of the last two decades' literature on economic policy, it seemed as though increasingly integrated NationStates have been implementing various combinations of macroeconomic and structural policies regardless of their size. This minimization of the role played by country size in growth strategies is likely to be related to the growing importance of globalization and regional integration but also to the focus (at times exclusive) put on supply-side economics.
Whatever the cause, the issue of country size is hopefully again the object of theoretical and empirical attention. The fertile cross-over between the new economic geography and the new trade theory, combining concepts such as integration, competition and agglomeration, enables to rediscover the crucial notions of borders, proximity and country size. A new literature following
McCallum (1995) thus seeks to shed light on the relation between the existence of borders (i.e.
geographic proximity between two jurisdictions) and the intensity of trade. The "death of distance" posited by some authors (see for instance Cairncross, 1997 ) appears more symbolic than empirical in the light of this line of economic analysis and empirical investigation. More specifically, a recent literature intends on exhuming the fundamental role of country size in the definition of growth strategies but also on highlighting how this role is evolving in the context of contemporary globalization.
Country size in the recent literature
The most recent works (see Alesina and Spolaore, 2003; Alesina, Spolaore and Warcziarg, 2005) attempt to determine endogenously national preferences using size as a causal factor. Country size itself is seen as resulting from a trade-off between citizens' preferences heterogeneity costs and economies of scale in the provision of public goods. This latter literature thus constitutes a good starting point for new research and investigation on the relation between country size and economic performance, government size but also institutional and political dynamics and international relations strategic interactions.
However promising, the new country size literature suffers from two important limitations that partly determine the interest of this project. First, it concentrates almost exclusively on the case of small open economies. In doing so, it finds itself in coherence with the seminal contemporary literature on country size (see Kuznets, 1960 , Demas, 1975 and Katzenstein, 1985 , but neglects thereof to study the issue of size symmetrically. We believe that country size plays a role for small and large countries (by definition less open) alike, although in different ways. Because of this asymmetric bias, this literature does not depart entirely from the "country model" one that tends to compare social compacts without reference to the "size of nations".
What is more, this literature does not deal with the role played by country size within intergovernmental entities and regional integration dynamics. It offers an interesting absolute approach to size and formulates problems and solutions related to the "optimal size" of political and economic federations or unions. But it does not offer much insight on the comparative effect of size. An analysis of economic and political interactions between countries of different size and of the way country size shapes constraints and preferences in terms of macroeconomic policies and structural reforms thus appears necessary, especially given the dual current context of globalization and regional integration. In this theoretical context, we are even more inclined to (re)investigate the relation between country size and growth strategy. The EU, and more specifically the Euro area, are natural case studies of an inquiry into the effect of country size on growth strategy. The choice of regional and national economic policies as well as the efficiency of federal rules or even the justification of their very existence depends crucially on both national and regional size.
Tensions are indeed mounting in the contemporary period between large and small countries of a more than ever numerous and heterogeneous EU and Euro area (see Laurent and Le Cacheux, 2006) . The implementation of monetary and fiscal rules and more generally the very nature of economic integration modalities are at stake. What is more, small European countries seem much more economically successful than large ones and show a much better capacity to grow and reform their economic and institutional structures. This is why we are inclined to shed more light on a possible "size nexus" in the Euro area.
The conditionality of the link between size and economic growth noted by many authors is indeed crucial to understand. Alesina and Spolaore (2005) , for instance, show that country size matters for economic prosperity to the extent that the country is not integrated with the rest of the world. The more a country is globalized, the less its size will be an advantage. The fact that small countries have prospered more than large ones in the Euro area can thus be related to the fact that benefits of country size decrease as economic integration increases. To put it differently, the benefits of trade openness and economic integration are larger for smaller countries: GDP 
A strategic approach to country size
What is specific about belonging in the Euro area? Obviously, institutions and rules of the game differ from what applies in the rest of the world. In order to give substance to our reasoning in terms of political economy of growth policies, let us be more explicit about assumptions and analytical framework. Two analytical issues would seem to deserve some elaboration, before we move on to examining the cases of Ireland and Germany, as emblematic of two polar cases amongst Euro area members: one is the notion of a country's strategy; the other is the assumptions to be made with regard to preferences in strategic contexts.
When analyzing the national economic policy choices facing a small country in the global economy, the natural assumption to make is, indeed, that of the small open economy, which is the most commonly made in such contexts. This assumption has the great advantage of eliminating all strategic considerations from the analysis: the small, open economy is the exact equivalent, on the international scene, of the private agent in a perfect competition environment;
it is a price-taker on all relevant markets. The notion of atomicity, common to the perfect competition and to the small, open economy analytical frameworks, implies that the small economy's authorities can safely ignore any induced consequences of its own actions on the rest of the world. Or, to put it in other words, the small country's situation in this case is not strategic. This is so both because of atomicity, and because the small country's authorities are assumed to exert full control over their own economic policy instruments: there are, therefore, no sources of interdependencies.
Things are different for large countries in the global context: they can no longer be assumed to be price takers. Hence they are usually treated as having some market power, but still supposing they decide on their policy moves in a passive environment, with no feedback or reaction from other players.
However, these simple assumptions regarding each country's environment and situation when having to decide on economic policy options are not appropriate in the Euro area context. For one thing, the small, open economy assumption is no longer warranted, and one has to recognize the strategic characteristics of member states' decisions when it comes to growth policies, and more generally economic and social policies. The reason is fundamentally that countries, small and large, are no longer playing against a passive environment, but are in strategic conditions:
there are interdependencies, arising from the existence of shared policy instruments, that are managed in common according to specific rules of the game, as well as from the presence of spillover effects of all kinds in the context of a single market operating with a single currency.
Hence, national policy-makers are not facing the same constraints and the same payoffs as in the global context, and, when making policy decisions, they usually have to take other countries' decision makers' expected reactions into account, a dimension that profoundly alters the nature of the games they will want to play.
But how to specify these games, and the countries' strategic choices? In line with the classic literature on international policy making, economic policy coordination, and world public goods 3 that a country's government, namely those who have to power to decide and mobilize economic policy instruments that are under the country's control, and to partake in collective decisionmaking processes over regional, common policy instruments, may be treated as a rational actor, in the traditional way of standard economic analysis. In addition, it is supposed that domestic considerations dominate in their preferences, which implicitly assumes that "borders matter" (McCallum, 1995) , so that it is possible and meaningful to distinguish between "inside" and "outside" the domestic economy, and that national governments care mostly about their residents' welfare. The latter assumption may be regarded as excessively idealistic; but it may be justified as a simple reflection of the national dimensions of democratic processes: voters elect national decision-makers, who are, in the current institutional context of the EU and the Euro area, the players in domestic as well as European economic policy games. From this perspective, what matters are the rules of the game, the instruments in the various players' hands, and the constraints they are facing.
Hence, we will not assume that national governments' preferences are different in the Euro area context from what they were before its creation, that they are different in large and in small countries, or indeed different from governments' preferences in other, non-Euro, European countries, in other regions of the world, or other regional groupings: they may, or may not be.
But we argue that they chose different strategies because they face different constraints and different policy options; in other words, given their preferences, the cost-benefit analysis of their policy choices is different, so that their rational choices will be different too.
Constraints and policy options of countries: small and large, the games they play
Let us apply all this to macroeconomic policies for stabilization and growth of the domestic One way of looking at the problem is to argue that a small country does not need macroeconomic stabilization instruments the way a large one does. 5 For a small open economy, traditional fiscal policy of the Keynesian kind will usually be of little efficiency, whereas all policies that improve the competitiveness of the national economy by lowering production costs of firms located in the domestic economy are relatively more powerful: this may explain why fiscal consolidations in small countries have been found to have "non-Keynesian" effects in the EU; it also suggests that tax competition, "structural reforms" and wage moderation policies will all have very powerful, positive effects for a small open economy, both because domestic demand represent a fraction of demand to domestic firms and because the elasticity of the supply of external capital -in particular foreign direct investments -is higher, the smaller and the more open the economy is. In addition, policies that lower production costs in a small economy do not harm domestic demand very much, and they have little incidence on domestic inflation, so that they do not raise real interest rates, as nominal rates in a monetary union tend to be uniform across countries and to be relatively less influenced by the policies of a single, small country.
For large countries on the contrary, free riding is impossible and the various policies reviewed above tend to be more costly, or even counterproductive for the economic system. Keynesianstyle demand-management policies, especially fiscal policies, are more efficient for large relatively closed economies than for small open economies. On the other hand, all policies tending to lower production costs are less effective, and they all tend to lead to a lower domestic inflation, which then results in a higher real interest rate, so that they tend to be costly in terms of economic activity and growth. This is where the rules constraining the use of stabilization policies in the Euro area are paramount: they are much more painful for large countries than for small nations. This is how country size plays into economic performance in the Euro area..
growth", i.e. a growth systematically biased in favor of small states of the Euro area given the European economic constitution. In quantitative terms, the systematic divergence between small states and large states that amount to 2.3 percentage points in real growth, 0.73 percentage point in inflation and 3.12 percentage points in public finance balance. We also find that the gap between small and large countries in terms of unemployment and long-term unemployment is respectively of 3.9 and 2.2 percentage points. The "size nexus," both for growth and unemployment, seems stronger than any "social nexus" (highlighting the role of labour market and social policies), in the Euro area. We should now look more closely at Ireland and Germany to find confirmation of our approach.
The "Irish Tiger": a wonder of globalization?
Many factors are mobilized to account for the Irish miracle, but oddly enough, European integration is barely part of it 6 . Yet, a careful study of the economic history of Ireland shows that the beginning of the economic "miracle" coincides with Ireland's integration in the EU (1973), strengthens with the Single Act (1986) and accelerates with the launch of the EMU (1992). What is more, while the features of the Irish "liberal" model of welfare state is put forward in the explanation of the stellar Irish growth performance, it is often forgotten that the UK, which shares much of the same features, has not benefited as much from the European integration (Chart 6). A "small country effect" must have played a role in the European Irish success. The "Irish tiger", which has become economically bigger than it was, is not a happy by-product of global economy but a result of the European economic constitution and the type of growth regime it favours and encourages. 1979 1981 1983 1985 1987 1989 1991 1993 1995 1997 1999 The two pillars of the Irish "miracle", trade and tax competition, would not have been that successful outside of the European economic constitution. The European economic constitution is asymmetric: it allows integration of capital markets but not the harmonization of tax policies.
In his context, tax competition by small economies is bound to prosper. Because of its smallness, Ireland felt compelled to lower its tax rate more than other countries without having to fear retaliation.
The final important ingredient to add to the Irish recipe is the European budget, which has shown to be very efficient in small countries, with fewer regional disparities than large ones. The
Irish Ministry of Finance calculates a total of 40,176.6 m euros net receipts from the EU budget Ireland has become one of the richest European nations, structural funds still amounted to 3,35 billion euros, or 25% of the financing of the "national development plan" 9 .
For all its brilliance, Ireland performance is not guaranteed to last forever as Chart 8 suggests.
Some concerns have indeed been expressed about the viability of the functional openness growth strategy, while new Eastern member states can also play the tax competition game, and in a not so distant future, the trade one also. But does an "Irish model" exist, or was it more something of a prototype? Can the Irish success be replicated by others or was it only possible because Ireland was the only country playing this game? In any event, under-investment in human capital in particular is a concern for the Irish economy if it is to change the nature of its growth strategy (see OECD, 2006) . Katzenstein (1985) remarked that States were shrinking as they gradually became more open to foreign trade in an integrating world. But large states remain fundamentally dependent on their domestic market for growth. The German economic paradox lies at the intersection of those two assertions: Germany is the largest European state (34% of euro area GDP and 26% of EU GDP) and, at the same time, the world leading exporter (cf. infra).
The German frog: how to shrink a large country
First, the obvious fact is that Germany is large economy. As such, its domestic demand plays the dominant role in the use of its GDP: private consumption alone represented almost 60% of German GDP in 2005 (see Table 3 ).
9 Cf. The European social funds in Ireland, http://www.esf.ie/en/homepage.aspx billion $ in services (with the same growth rate), compared to 353 billion $ in services for the US (with a 5% growth) and 904 billions $ in merchandise (with a 3% growth). Of course, this has to be put in the perspective of Germany's reunification. In 1990, for the GFR, the GDP was 1306 billion euros and exports 421 billions (already 32% of GDP). In 1991, GDP for the whole country amounted to 1534 billions euros with exports falling to 395 billions (27% of GDP). But while the German domestic market has been enlarged, the export-led growth strategy was pushed further and not moderated. The share of exports in GDP is almost stable from 1991 to 1999 (it increases from 25% to 29%) but climbs by 10 points from 1999 to 2005. How did Germany achieve this performance? Mostly thanks to an aggressive competitiveness strategy. As with Ireland, one can wonder if the German performance was mostly due to specifically European factors or more generally to globalization. One interesting point to look at in this respect is the evolution of the Euro exchange-rate, which in effective terms has appreciated since 2002. How to make sense of an exports boom with a currency appreciation? One has to distinguish two elements for Germany: the real exchange rate with Euro area main trade partners and the nominal exchange rate with main trade partners outside the Euro area. The European component of the German success then appears prominent. Source: Destatis and authors calculations. Source: ECB and authors calculations.
What about the other trading partners outside the Euro area? Table 6 shows the evolution of nominal exchange rates between Germany and its main trading partners outside the Euro area.
Here also, the evolution is favorable, with the US of course but also with China and Russia while Germany's competitiveness has been stable with the UK, Poland or Hungary. Source: ECB There is no denying that the German competitiveness effort has been a huge success in terms of net exports growth. But is it compatible with the fact that Germany is a large country? It appears Why did Germany choose that strategy? The answer lies in the incentives system devised by the European economic constitution and especially the Euro area constrains on stabilization policies: large countries are encouraged to behave like small ones, and thus to compete using real "social disinflation" rather than nominal exchange-rate policy, i.e. to adopt competitiveness policies focused on labor cost reduction and welfare state roll-back policies. Since they are not small, the results are not as good for them and, worse even, they trigger strategic reaction from other large countries, who in turn will engage in the social race to the bottom. Some elements of this worstcase scenario for Euro area social models have already appeared (see Laurent, 2006 
Is Germany gaining weight?
Germany appears to develop its domestic market again in 2006 (consumption remains weak but investment has certainly picked up), but the exports performance is still a major part of national growth. The strength of the current recovery is thus more than ever in question, and the issue of the evolution of wages will be crucial in this perspective. If Germany continues its economic extraversion, it is possible that its recovery will be short-lived, not to mention the risk of a downturn in global demand. Source: OECD.
The exports performance can once again be detailed. The two phenomena already noted, the real depreciation of the German "currency" in the Euro area and the nominal depreciation of the Euro against Germany's main EU Eastern trading partners have intensified. If there is some truth to the idea of the "Bazaar economy" (Sinn, 2007) , it is in the fact that Germany has become something of a "Mittleconomy": it competes eastward with appreciating currencies in nominal terms for buying, and westwards with appreciating currencies in real terms for selling. While the trade with Easter Europe increases (Table 9) , real depreciation in the Euro area (Table 10 ) and nominal depreciation with Eastern European countries (Chart 14) have continued. The German and Irish case studies show how much country size matters in the Euro area. Taken together, they also point to a concerning evolution: if all Euro area countries start behaving like small economies, social and tax competition is bound to prosper, but not the Euro area.
The Euro area is fundamentally a big closed economy: its degree of openness is close to that of the largest of its members. This means that it should allow for macroeconomic policies in order to make the most of its domestic market if it wants to stimulate its economic growth, like much of large countries in the developed world (US, UK, Australia, Canada,…). Otherwise, in applying economic rules made for small economies while it is truly a large economy, it runs the risk of structurally jeopardizing its growth and pitting against one another its largest economies.
The recent evolution of tax competition on corporate taxation is a striking example of how not only small countries compete against large ones, but large ones compete against other large economies. Germany announced in May 2007 that it would lower its global corporate taxation (local and federal) from 38,9% today to 29,8% on January 1 st 2008. This move targets the other large economies of the EU (see Chart 15), and the UK has already announced that it would lower its own tax rate from 30% to 28%, exactly below the new German level. France (34, 4%) and Italy (33%) are bound to follow suit. The EU is already the region of the world were corporate taxation is the lowest (see Chart 15).
Because of economic rules that do not take enough into account country size, European countries today find themselves in the opposite movement of building the welfare state in the context of the first globalization . A century after Bismarck, the French law on labor accidents (1898) or the institution of the income tax, they rival not to build but to dismantle their welfare state. And yet, social compacts remain the only efficient way to balance globalization. Source: OECD and KPMG.
